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SIMANDLE, Chief Judge: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 After Plaintiff William F. Saponaro, Jr. was arrested for 
engaging in a sexual encounter with a minor who used Defendant 
Grindr, LLC’s online social networking service to arrange the 
encounter, he sued Defendant for negligence for allowing a minor 
child to access and utilize its social networking site. This 
matter comes before the Court upon Defendant’s motion to dismiss 
[Docket Item 5] under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim for which relief can be granted.  
 Because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Court will grant Defendant’s 
motion and will dismiss this action. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 The facts of this case are drawn from the Complaint and are 
accepted as true for purposes of this motion.1  
 Plaintiff is an adult male who owns a construction and 
restoration company in the Cape May community. (Compl. ¶¶ 1, 
14.) Defendant is a Limited Liability Company, organized in the 
State of California, which owns and operates two all-male online 
geo-social networking applications “Grindr” and “GrindrX.” (Id. 
at ¶¶ 2–4.)   
1 Although, as a general rule, a party’s reliance upon factual 
materials extraneous to the pleadings would require the Court to 
treat a motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment under Rule 
56, see Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 634 F.2d 127, 
129 (3d Cir. 1980), the Court may consider a “document integral 
to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint,” or an 
“undisputedly authentic document” without converting the motion. 
In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 
287 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) and Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 
(3d Cir. 1993)). In this case, the Complaint explicitly relies 
upon Defendant’s age restriction, found in its terms of service. 
As the parties do not dispute the language of Defendant’s terms 
of service, the Court will consider the Terms of Service (Ex. C 




                     
 Plaintiff claims that on June 21, 2012, a 13 year old minor 
(the “minor”) used Defendant’s GrindrX service to solicit a 
sexual encounter with Mark LeMunyon (“LeMunyon”), a 24 year old 
man who subscribes to Defendant’s online services. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 
5.) Upon receiving the minor’s solicitation, LeMunyon contacted 
Plaintiff and arranged a sexual encounter between himself, the 
minor, and Plaintiff.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) The arranged “three 
party sexual liason” came to fruition at Plaintiff’s home in 
Cape May some time during the following week. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 7.) 
On June 28, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested in Cape May County, New 
Jersey and charged with sexual assault and endangering the 
welfare of a child in connection with the aforementioned sexual 
encounter. (Id. at ¶ 8.) He currently faces charges in excess of 
20 years in prison. (Id.) 
 On June 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action 
against Defendant in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 
Division, Cape May County. [Docket Item 1.] In Count One, 
Plaintiff claims that Defendant was negligent by allowing the 
minor to hold himself out as an adult of consenting age on its 
online service. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts 
2 It appears that LeMunyon and Plaintiff had some form of pre-
existing relationship prior to the operative events of this 
case; however, the nature and extent of that relationship is 
neither detailed in the Complaint nor relevant for determining 
the merits of Defendant’s motion. 
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that he reasonably relied upon Defendant’s age-restriction (a 
minimum of 18 years of age, 21 years in places where 21 years is 
the age of majority) found in the Grindr Terms of Service, and 
that Defendant’s negligent failure to enforce its age-
restriction directly resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest and 
corresponding financial expenditures. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 11, 14–17; 
Pl.’s Br. Ex. D. at 1.) Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint 
asserts a cause of action against Defendant for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. ¶¶ 18–25.) 
 Defendant removed the action to this Court and filed a 
motion to dismiss [Docket Items 1, 5.] Defendant argues that it 
is immune from liability in its capacity as an “interactive 
computer service” provider under the Communications Decency Act, 
47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”). (Def.’s Br. 1.) Defendant further 
argues that it did not owe any duty to Plaintiff under 
traditional negligence principles and did not proximately cause 
Plaintiff’s damages. (Id. at 1, 2.) 
 For the reasons set forth below, the Court holds that 
Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Communications Decency Act. 
Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims of 
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress fail 




III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept all 
factual allegations as true, construe the Complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under 
any reasonable reading of the Complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). The complaint must allege sufficient 
factual matter, which, when accepted as true, “state[s] a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 A motion to dismiss may be granted only if a court 
concludes that the plaintiff has failed to set forth fair notice 
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests that 
make such a claim plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require 
“detailed factual allegations,” it requires “more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 The salient issues in this case are whether Defendant is 
immune from liability under the Communications Decency Act, 47 
U.S.C. § 230 (the “CDA”), and whether Plaintiff has otherwise 
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pled sufficient facts to state claims for negligence and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
A. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Communications Decency 
Act. 
 The CDA’s “Good Samaritan” clause provides, in pertinent 
part, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(1) (emphasis added). Section 230 also provides that “[n]o 
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed 
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).   
 As a practical matter, this statutory language “‘precludes 
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer 
service provider in a publisher’s role’ and bars ‘lawsuits 
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.’” 
Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th 
Cir. 1997). Accordingly, interactive computer service providers 
cannot be held liable for publishing harmful information that is 
generated by a third party. For example, if an online tabloid 
enables users to anonymously upload comments to its stories, the 
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tabloid would not be liable for defamatory statements within 
those comments. See Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment 
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“If a website 
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then 
it is only a service provider with respect to that content—and 
thus is immune from claims predicated on that content.”).3 
 The Third Circuit has recognized the CDA’s immunity 
provision to protect internet service providers from allegations 
of negligently failing to monitor their websites. See Green, 318 
F.3d at 471. In Green, the plaintiff sued a chat room’s host for 
defamatory statements generated by another user. Id. at 469, 
471. The plaintiff sought to hold the host liable for failing to 
monitor its chat room. Id. The Court of Appeals barred the 
claim, stating that monitoring is a function “quintessentially 
related to a publisher’s role[,]” liability for which is 
specifically proscribed by the CDA. Id. at 471. 
 In this case, Plaintiff’s claims fail for the same reason. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant is an interactive 
computer service provider within the meaning of the CDA because 
its website gives subscribers access to a common server for 
3 This principal is not without its limits. The CDA was not meant 
to immunize internet service providers for all activity on their 
websites; they are, indeed, still responsible for their own 
wrongful conduct. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 
1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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purposes of social networking. See § 230(f)(2) (defining an 
“interactive computer service” as “any information service, 
system, or access software that provides or enables computer 
access by multiple users to a computer server. . . .”). 
Plaintiff also seeks to hold Defendant responsible for failing 
to monitor its website: in the Complaint, Plaintiff repeatedly 
characterizes Defendant’s wrongdoing as “failing to properly 
supervise its site.” (See Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, 19–20). Plaintiff 
argues that as a consequence, a thirteen-year-old was allowed to 
use its services and to hold himself out as an adult, which 
created the circumstance that ultimately led to Plaintiff’s 
arrest. Plaintiff therefore claims that Defendant should be 
liable for the harm caused by publishing the minor’s assertion 
that he was over eighteen years of age. Because the Third 
Circuit has expressly interpreted the CDA to immunize 
interactive service providers from this type of liability, see 
Green, 318 F.3d at 471, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed as 
a matter of law. 
 The Fifth Circuit has addressed CDA immunity in a similar 
factual context. In Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 
2008), the mother of a 13 year old girl sued a social network 
provider for allowing her daughter to access its website and 
meet a 19 year old man, who used the website to arrange a 
meeting and sexually assault her. Id. at 416–17. The mother 
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alleged that the social network provider, by failing to 
implement institutional safeguards, violated its duty to protect 
minors who use its services. Id. at 419. The Fifth Circuit 
rejected this argument, stating that this categorization was 
“merely another way of claiming that [the social network 
provider] was liable for publishing the communications” between 
her daughter and the 19 year old man. Id. at 420 (emphasis 
added).  
 Furthermore, despite Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), 
does not affect the Court’s holding because Defendant did not 
actively develop illegal content on its site. In Fair Housing, 
the Ninth Circuit refused to grant CDA protection to a housing 
website that specifically asked users to disclose their sex, 
family status and sexual orientation in violation of the Fair 
Housing Act. Id. at 1166. The Ninth Circuit held that by 
eliciting specific unlawful information from users, the website 
acted as a developer of content, rather than merely a publisher, 
and was therefore subject to liability. Id. 
 Plaintiff attempts to analogize this case to Fair Housing 
and its progeny by claiming that Defendant was not merely a 
conduit, but rather an active developer, of the information that 
is published on its site. To support this argument, Plaintiff 
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relies on the fact that Defendant’s site “contains questions to 
be answered including a profile, the posting of pictures, and 
dropdown menus suggesting content.” (Pl.’s Br. at 13.)  
 The Court does not find the comparison to Fair Housing 
persuasive. Even assuming Plaintiff’s factual assertions to be 
true, as the Court must, the questions that Defendant poses to 
its subscribers when creating a profile substantively differ 
from those posed by the defendant in Fair Housing in one 
significant respect: they do not develop content that facially 
violates a state or federal statute. Defendant’s online 
questionnaire asks users to enter information about themselves, 
but these questions are facially benign. Plaintiff does not 
allege – nor does the Court find – that Defendants’ 
questionnaire solicits from users information that is illegal.  
 This distinction is readily apparent in Fair Housing. 
There, the Court specifically noted that “[a] dating website 
that requires users to enter their sex, race, religion and 
marital status through drop-down menus . . . does not contribute 
to any alleged illegality,” since “[i]t is perfectly legal to 
discriminate along those lines in dating, and thus there can be 
no claim based solely on the content of these questions.” Fair 
Housing, 521 F.3d at 1169 and n.3. Similarly, in this case, 
Defendant merely “provid[ed] neutral tools to carry out what may 
be unlawful or illicit [conduct]”; under Fair Housing, such 
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conduct does not amount to “development” under section 230 of 
the CDA. Id. 
 Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that 
Congressional intent warrants a narrow construction of the CDA. 
(Pl.’s Br. at 9.) The language of the CDA unambiguously 
prohibits interactive service providers like GrinderX from being 
“treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Zeran, “[b]y its plain language, 
§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.” Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 
330. Where, as here, the language of the statute is clear, 
“there is no need to pursue a deeper inquiry into its meaning.” 
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 23–54 (1992) 
(citations omitted); see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 
U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“When the statute’s language is plain, the 
sole function of the courts – at least where the disposition 
required by the test is not absurd – is to enforce it according 
to its terms.”); Alston v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 585 F.3d 
753, 762 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that district court’s reliance 
on purpose of statute after having discerned a contrary plain 
language meaning was error); Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 
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137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required.”).  
 The Court also notes that the CDA manifests a Congressional 
policy supporting broad immunity. Section 230 was enacted to 
“maintain the robust nature of internet communication and, 
accordingly, to limit government interference in the medium to a 
minimum.” Obado v. Magedson, 2014 WL 3778261, at *3 (D.N.J. Jul. 
31, 2014) (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330). The statute provides 
that “[t]he Internet and other interactive computer services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, 
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad 
avenues for intellectual activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). It 
additionally states that the “policy of the United States” is to 
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Id. § 230(b)(2).  
 Courts have promulgated Congress’s intent by applying CDA 
immunity according to its own clear terms. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 
F.3d at 331. This Court must do the same, and it is not this 
Court’s function or role to substitute its judgment for the 
policy choices made by Congress in promoting communications on 
the internet. Holding interactive service providers liable for 
third-party communications would have chilling implications for 
free speech on the internet. Specifically, if social network 
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hosts are faced with liability every time third-party 
communications on their networks result in harm, they are left 
with two extreme courses of action if they wish to ensure 
insulation from liability: either over-police their networks, 
taking down communications that might ultimately be harmless; 
or, strip users of the ability to post communications 
altogether. Id.; see also, Dimeo v. Max, 433 F.Supp.2d 523, 528 
(E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that without CDA protection, interactive 
computer services would either have to employ an army of highly-
trained monitors to patrol its services, or shut down internet 
forums altogether). Such an outcome would contravene the express 
purpose of the CDA.  
 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are barred 
by the CDA, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.  
B. Plaintiff has failed to state claims for negligence and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
 Even if the CDA were not implicated in this case, Plaintiff 
has sufficiently pled a claim for negligence or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). To establish a cause 
of action for negligence in New Jersey, a plaintiff must 
establish four elements: (1) a duty of care owed by the 
defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty by the 
defendant, (3) actual and proximate causation, and (4) damages. 
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Utility Co., 59 A.3d 
13 
 
561, 571 (N.J. 2013). To establish a cause of action for NIED, 
the defendant’s negligence must have caused severe emotional 
distress. See Gendek v. Poblete, 654 A.2d 970, 972 (N.J. 1995).  
 Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress must fail because the Defendant did not 
owe him a duty of care. To determine whether a defendant owes a 
duty to the plaintiff, a “significant consideration” is whether 
the plaintiff is a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s 
conduct. Carvalho v. Toll Bros. and Developers, 675 A.2d 209, 
212 (N.J. 1996). “Once the foreseeability of an injured party is 
established, . . . considerations of fairness and policy govern 
whether the imposition of a duty is warranted.” Carter Lincoln–
Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1288 (N.J. 
1994). This assessment of fairness and policy “involves 
identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors—the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, 
the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public 
interest in the proposed solution.” Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo 
Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993) (citing Goldberg v. 
Housing Auth., 186 A.2d 291 (1962)).  
 In this case, Plaintiff cannot establish a duty because he 
was not a foreseeable victim of Defendant’s alleged negligence. 
The communications that occurred on Defendant’s website that 
ultimately led to the illegal sexual encounter were exclusively 
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between LeMunyon and the minor, both of whom were registered 
subscribers to the website. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiff does 
not allege to be a subscriber to the website, nor does he allege 
to have participated in the communications with the minor on 
Defendant’s site. Indeed, there is no allegation that Plaintiff 
ever used Defendant’s site at all. He was not a foreseeable 
plaintiff in this case, and therefore Defendant did not owe a 
duty of care towards him. Plaintiff asserts that “the defendants 
[sic] must clearly have foreseen the potential for use by 
minors.” (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 14.) This argument, although perhaps 
relevant to the question of whether harm to an underage user of 
Grindr was foreseeable, does not show that there was a 
foreseeable risk that a non-Grindr user would be injured by the 
online actions of a minor.4  
4 Furthermore, the Hopkins fairness factors weigh against 
imposing a duty on Defendant to monitor its website. With 
regards to the relationship between the parties, the Complaint 
does not allege the existence of any direct relationship between 
Plaintiff and Defendant; rather, Plaintiff alleges that he was a 
third-party who utilized Defendant’s services merely via 
LeMunyon, who acted as an intermediary. (See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6.) 
Further, concerning the ability to exercise care, the Third 
Circuit has previously held, in a similar context, that 
publishers of online content do not have the ability to exercise 
care over user-generated content. See generally, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Finally, with regards to the public interest, this Opinion has 
already touched upon the express public policy that supports CDA 
immunity. This same policy, namely the promotion of free speech 
on the internet, weighs against imposing a common-law duty on 
Defendant to monitor its website for the protection of non-
users. This Court does not address, in this instance, whether an 
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 Given this disposition, there is no need to address 
Defendant’s alternative ground that Plaintiff was the 
intervening cause of his own harm, since it was Plaintiff who 
met and had contact with this 13 year-old boy, not Defendant. 
Much common sense supports this argument, but it may not be 
resolvable on a motion to dismiss in which Plaintiff’s 
allegation, that he was unaware of the boy’s age, must be 
accepted as true. 
 Thus, in addition to being barred by the CDA, Plaintiff’s 
negligence and NIED claims also fail as a matter of law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Because Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Communications 
Decency Act and because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a 
claim for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss 




 March 13, 2015         s/ Jerome B. Simandle                                    
Date       JEROME B. SIMANDLE 
       Chief U.S. District Judge
online dating service such as this defendant has a duty to 
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